Over latest many years, Sino-Japanese relations have been outlined by repeated predictions of battle and hostility between the 2 East Asian states (The Guardian, 2014; McCurry, 2014). These predictions seemed to be coming true within the early 2010s, following the escalation of the territorial dispute within the East China Sea and renewed requires Japanese remilitarisation (Lee, 2011; Sieg, 2019). Yet since 2017, Sino-Japanese relations have been experiencing a détente characterised by elevated financial cooperation. Resultantly, an optimistic case will be made that this détente might lead to sustained cooperation between China and Japan (CGTN, 2019; Nakamura, 2020). However, the détente will finally give strategy to renewed tensions and hostility.
This article presents the pessimistic rebuttal to the optimistic case for sustained cooperation. Discussion begins with an outline of the origins of the détente in US foreign-economic coverage and its defining traits of financial cooperation and the idea of Hot Politics, Cold Economics. This is adopted by an exploration of the optimistic case for sustained cooperation primarily based on Sino-Japanese participation within the institution of a regional rules-based order and proof for financial interdependence between the 2 international locations. The ultimate part of this text presents a pessimistic rebuttal to the factors raised within the optimistic case. This rebuttal consists of an evaluation of the altering context of Sino-Japanese relations, proof for the presence of competitors for regional affect, and a dialogue of the failings of the Hot Economics, Cold Politics idea. This dialogue pessimistically concludes that the altering context, regional competitors and underlying political problems with Sino-Japanese relations will see an finish to the détente.
The Origins and Characteristics of the Sino-Japanese Détente
The origins of the Sino-Japanese détente are externally pushed, rooted in each China and Japan’s relationship with the USA. The present commerce warfare between China and the USA has diminished China’s commerce and funding earnings. Investment and commerce income streams are important for China as they offset the structural constraints on its financial system, particularly declining labour power development and slowing productiveness (World Bank, n.d.). The US-China commerce warfare has diminished these income streams considerably, with the worth of Chinese exports to the USA falling by $53 billion within the first 9 months of 2019 (Liesman, 2019). As a results of this antagonistic US coverage, China turned to the world’s third largest financial system, Japan, as a substitute supply for misplaced earnings. This is obvious on condition that, in anticipation of a commerce warfare with the US, China elevated bilateral commerce with Japan by 7.8% and established itself as Japan’s second largest buying and selling associate (Ministry of Commerce People’s Republic of China, 2017). Increased financial cooperation with Japan is due to this fact a direct results of antagonistic US foreign-economic coverage.
Meanwhile, the Trump administration’s menace to withdraw US troops from East Asia if Japan didn’t broaden its personal navy has impelled Japan in direction of cooperation with China (Klinger et al., 2019). Trump’s place is problematic for Japan as Article 9 of its structure severely limits Japanese navy capabilities. Thus, Japan is determined by its US ally for navy safety when it comes to offering each a navy deterrence to would-be attackers and enhancing the operational effectiveness of Japan’s defence power (Chiang, 2019). Due to its constitutional restrictions on navy power, Japan has historically engaged different nations economically to discourage any potential hostilities (Tamaki, 2020). The menace of US withdrawal from the area has equally inspired Japan to interact economically with China. Capitalising on China’s willingness to interact, Japan has used financial cooperation as a mitigation to any future Chinese menace (Brito, 2019). This technique goals to make sure nationwide safety within the absence of a US navy presence within the area.
With one occasion needing financial safety whereas the opposite is utilizing financial engagement as means to pursue nationwide safety, the Sino-Japanese détente is closely characterised by elevated financial cooperation. This has seen the resumption of the China-Japan high-level financial dialogue, which had been suspended for eight years (Nikkei, 2018; Hurst, 2018). Additionally, China and Japan have embarked upon new avenues of financial cooperation within the type of joint-macroeconomic ventures. A Sino-Japanese committee has been established to advertise cooperation and stop competitors within the deliberate Asian infrastructure tasks over the subsequent decade, predicted to be value $26 trillion (Shimada, 2018). This joint-macroeconomic enterprise presents a long-term plan for Sino-Japanese financial cooperation and has established engagement amongst Japanese companies for the Belt and Road Initiative, China’s international programme of infrastructure tasks in creating nations (Mastro, 2019; Ito, 2019).
This financial cooperation is a direct distinction to the early 2010s, when economics was a instrument for political achieve in a confrontational Sino-Japanese relationship. For instance, in 2010, in opposition to a backdrop of large-scale anti-Japanese protests, China threatened Japanese manufacturing by reducing uncommon earth exports over the territorial dispute within the East China Sea (Green et al., 2017).
Whilst financial cooperation has elevated, engagement between China and Japan over the political points of their relationship is restricted. This is in accordance with the idea of Hot Politics, Cold Economics. This is the concept China and Japan can have interaction each other by way of intense financial cooperation and that this may transcend the contentious political points of their relationship (Dreyer, 2014). Such points embrace competitors over regional affect, Japanese makes an attempt at Article 9 reform and the territorial dispute within the East China Sea (Lee, 2011; He, 2013; Chiang, 2019).
It is obvious that the idea of Hot Economics, Cold Politics is at play within the present détente within the rhetoric used. For instance, Xinhua, China’s state media firm, has described the détente as a ‘win-win’ and for ‘mutual benefit’ while stating that China and Japan are ‘reserving differences’ (Xinhua, 2020). Given the exterior origins of the détente it’s logical to conclude that the ‘win-win’ is financial in nature, while the variations to which Xinhua refer are the seemingly irreconcilable viewpoints of China and Japan over the political points of their relationship.
An Optimistic Case
An optimistic case will be made that the Sino-Japanese détente will result in sustained cooperation between China and Japan. This case is present in liberal internationalism, a idea of worldwide relations positing that peace is achievable by way of the promotion of a rules-based order and interdependence between worldwide actors (Ikenberry et al., 2018). The logic underpinning this viewpoint is that with established guidelines actors can predict each other’s behaviour, whereas interdependence makes battle too expensive for these concerned. The validity of this logic has been examined utilizing knowledge fashions from historic case research, concluding that elevated financial engagement between two communities correlates with a diminished chance of battle rising in mentioned communities’ relationship (Ashan et al., 2020).
The latest announcement of a brand new regional buying and selling bloc which boasts each China and Japan as members means that each international locations are concerned about establishing and interesting with a rules-based order. The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership gives guidelines for financial engagement between member states with provisions for the regulation of mental property rights, monetary providers and e-commerce (BBC News, 2020a). While the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership is an financial bloc, the European Union units precedent for the remit of such organisations to develop extra time (Carnegie Endowment, 2010) and evolve into broader political, social and coverage cooperation (European Commission, 2020).
Franco-German relations would possibly present perception into the way forward for China and Japan’s relationship inside the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. This is as a result of, like China and Japan, France and Germany have a historical past crammed with rivalry and battle, however their shared expertise as founders and leaders of the European Union has, at the least partially, helped to forge a sustained relationship of cooperation and friendship (Gardner Feldman, 2019). Accordingly, by way of their shared expertise of collaborating to determine an financial rules-based order, it’s believable that China and Japan will set up a socio-political rules-based order by which their cooperative relationship will be sustained.
With respects to interdependence, China’s dependence on Japan is a key motivator for participation within the détente. This is as a result of China depends on Japan as a serious supply of funding and commerce earnings in an effort to mitigate its aforementioned structural financial points. In 2018 alone China acquired $124 billion in direct funding from Japanese sources (Chiang, 2019), bolstering China’s financial system within the absence of US earnings sources.
Another manner by which China depends on Japan is its reliance on Japanese experience for its international infrastructure tasks, notably these pertaining to high-speed rail. To fulfil its home high-speed rail tasks, China has relied on the switch of Japanese locomotive know-how to Chinese corporations. For instance, the switch of Mistibushi’s MT205 traction motor to CSR Zhuzhou Electric (Shimbun, 2017). This dependency on Japanese experience signifies that China stands to learn tremendously from direct Japanese enter of their plans for joint-infrastructure tasks, making a vested curiosity in sustained cooperation.
Meanwhile, Japan’s dependency on China will be present in its home monetary planning. In the face of stagnant financial development charges Japan has sought to diversify its financial portfolio, endeavor endeavours equivalent to encouraging immigration to bolster its work power, financial easing and selling new areas of development (McBride and Xu, 2019). One of those development areas is Japan’s tourism sector, for which a goal was set of 20 million guests per yr by 2020 (Chiang, 2019). During the détente Chinese tourism to Japan has grown exponentially. The variety of Chinese guests per yr elevated from 2.41 million in 2014 to 7.4 million in 2017 and in 2018 Chinese nationals accounted for 35% of all vacationer spending in Japan (Chiang, 2019). This upward pattern in Chinese vacationers through the détente led the Japanese authorities to double its goal to 40 million guests per yr by 2020 (Ibid.). This signifies that Japan’s tourism sector is changing into more and more depending on China, that means that the mitigation of financial stagnation is, at the least partially, depending on Sino-Japanese cooperation.
A Pessimistic Rebuttal
In response to the optimistic case for sustained cooperation, there’s a convincing pessimistic rebuttal. This rebuttal argues that the altering exterior context of Sino-Japanese relations will undermine any interdependence forming from financial cooperation. Writing early within the détente, Nikkei (2018) predicted that the ‘uncertain international environment’ which drove China and Japan collectively isn’t assured. This declare is proving right, with US President-Elect Biden planning to reaffirm US alliances within the area and re-engage China economically (Bisley, 2020). If this transition away from antagonistic US coverage involves fruition, it should take away the unique drivers for Sino-Japanese cooperation while additionally undermining interdependence.
In regard to China, an finish to the US-China commerce warfare would reduce Chinese dependence on Japan as a supply of earnings for funding and commerce income. Although it’s potential that China might keep Japan as its main supply for these income streams, China’s dependency on Japan is undermined merely by the existence of a viable various earnings supply. US funding in China totalled $116.2 billion in 2019 regardless of the US-China commerce warfare, indicating a doubtlessly vital money windfall ought to China refocus its financial engagement in direction of the USA post-trade warfare (Rudden, 2020). With China’s financial structural constraints unlikely to dissipate within the close to future, the increase in earnings that comes with shifting away from financial engagement with Japan and in direction of the USA might type a crucial a part of Chinese coverage to take care of development.
At the identical time, reassurances from the USA as to its navy help would reduce Japan’s dependence on financial cooperation. Japan might keep its financial cooperation with China whereas additionally benefiting from US safety ensures. However, as with Chinese dependence on Japanese funding and commerce earnings, it’s the existence of another supply of safety that undermines Japan’s dependence on financial cooperation as a method to mitigate any future China menace.
Japan elevated its defence price range by 2.7% in 2018 in response to issues about China’s rising navy power (Chiang, 2019). This enhance in defence spending through the détente means that Japan’s safety issues close to China will not be being eased by financial engagement alone. If that is the case, renewed US safety ensures lessening Japan’s dependence on financial cooperation may even see Japan strive various means to handle its insecurity with respect to China. The hypothetical growth of a Japanese nuclear deterrence, for instance, has been mentioned in recent times (Yoshida, 2019; Fitzpatrick, 2019).
Compounding the menace to Sino-Japanese cooperation arising from the altering exterior context is the latest change in Japan’s management. It is known that familiarity between nationwide leaders works to dispel uncertainty, resulting in higher alternative for cooperation and peaceable coexistence (Booth and Wheeler, 2007). Shinzo Abe, Japan’s prime minister from 2012-2020, was keen to take care of the détente for instance of a diplomatic success story of his premiership (Hurst, 2018). Certainly, Abe and Chinese president Xi Jinping had dedicated to working collectively to ease tensions. This improved relationship noticed Abe make the primary go to to China by a Japanese prime minister since earlier than the 2012 East China Sea dispute strained diplomatic relations (Rachman, 2020; Kyodo, 2019).
Having solely simply commenced his premiership, Abe’s successor Yushihide Suga doesn’t get pleasure from the familiarity that Abe might depend on on the outset of the détente. Meanwhile, Suga plans to proceed Abe’s extra contentious insurance policies, equivalent to Article 9 reform, which has confirmed unpopular in China (Rich, Inoue and Dooley, 2020). Suga has additionally been making controversial choices in his preliminary months, equivalent to appointing Nobou Kishi, a recognized supporter of Taiwan, as Defence Minister (Kobara, 2020). The implicit suggestion of Japan taking a stance over Taiwanese sovereignty might spark tensions with China sooner or later. This is due to China’s disputed declare on the island of Taiwan and its strict diplomatic situation that different international locations don’t recognise Taiwan as an impartial state (Ibid.). Accordingly, Japan’s change in management represents the removing of a stabilising variable in favour of cooperation alongside the approaching shift within the exterior context which first led to the détente.
Refuting the optimistic case’s declare that China and Japan want a shared rules-based order is the continuation of self-interested regional competitors. Despite collaboration in establishing a regional financial order, each international locations seem like pursuing their very own pursuits in competitors for regional affect, somewhat than working to determine new governance buildings. Evidence for this comes from China and Japan’s joint endeavor of the $6.9 billion Thai railway undertaking, the place Japan withdrew in favour of engaged on India’s high-speed railway (Wijaya and Osaki, 2019).
The option to work on India’s railway somewhat than Thailand’s in collaboration with China will be linked to Japan’s pursuit of a better relationship with India as a counterbalance to China’s regional affect. Japan and India share territorial issues, having overlapping territorial claims with China within the East China Sea and Himalayas respectively, and have been collaborating to safe strategic sea lanes in competitors with China (Chand and Garcia, 2017; BBC News, 2020b). This reveals that, regardless of cooperating to determine a regional financial order, self-interest and competitors additionally exist in Sino-Japanese relations as a barrier to increasing regional financial order into socio-political order. This additionally signifies a scarcity of substance in Sino-Japanese macroeconomic cooperation, and the failure of the brand new joint-infrastructure committee in mitigating Sino-Japanese competitors.
The ultimate argument on this pessimistic rebuttal of the optimistic case for sustained Sino-Japanese cooperation is rooted on the failings of Hot Economics, Cold Politics. At first look this appears a realistic method to international coverage, permitting for cooperation alongside competition. However, this method has been tried and failed a number of occasions earlier than by China and Japan. The results of these makes an attempt is a routine cycle of cooperation adopted by elevated competitors as unaddressed political points re-emerge and set off stress (Brito, 2019). This is a well-observed phenomenon in up to date Sino-Japanese relations. The final cooperative section seems to have occurred within the Nineties earlier than China turned more and more important of the US-Japan alliance and Japan started to noticeably contemplate remilitarisation (He, 2013; Manning, 2015).
China and Japan have launched measures through the present détente to handle the political points of their relationship, conferring hope that the détente might break the cycle of cooperation and tensions. One such mechanism is the launch of maritime and aerial communications system to keep away from hostilities arising from the territorial dispute within the East China Sea (Hurst, 2018). However, comparable efforts had been made in previous durations of financial cooperation and resulted in failure. For instance, within the late Nineties/early 2000s China and Japan agreed to handle fishing rights within the East China Sea just for the difficulty to re-emerge in 2010 with mass-protests and the deployment of naval vessels to the disputed area (Zou, 2003; Lee, 2011). Past failures to handle political tensions in periods of financial cooperation present precedent that the mechanisms being put in place through the present détente may even fail.
Efforts to handle somewhat than handle underlying political points inside the parameters of financial cooperation depart these points to resurface as soon as the drivers of cooperation change. Given the above prediction that Biden will reverse the Trump administration’s antagonistic foreign-economic insurance policies, the re-emergence of underlying political points could also be imminent. Some unaddressed political points, particularly competitors for regional affect, are already evident. Consequentially, it seems that the détente has failed to interrupt the cycle of cooperation and tensions arising from the idea of Hot Politics, Cold Economics. This makes sustained Sino-Japanese cooperation not possible.
Considering the proof, it’s tough to be optimistic that the Sino-Japanese détente will set up sustained cooperation between China and Japan. Rather, it’s logical to be pessimistic and conclude that, finally, Sino-Japanese relations will return to tensions and hostility. This is pushed by the altering exterior context of Sino-Japanese relations. The removing of one of many main components within the creation of the détente will weaken China and Japan’s dependence on financial cooperation with each other. At the identical time, Japan’s latest change in management has weakened familiarity between the 2 international locations, eradicating it as a stabilising variable for cooperation. Japan’s new prime minister can be persevering with contentious insurance policies and making controversial choices of his personal which might spark tensions with China.
China and Japan are cooperating within the institution of a regional financial order within the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. However, simultaneous Sino-Japanese competitors for regional affect poses a barrier for the enlargement of any rules-based financial order to the socio-political sphere, whereas additionally undermining joint macroeconomic ventures. Finally, the underlying political points in Sino-Japanese relations, left unaddressed by the détente, are prone to re-emerge as financial cooperation wanes. This is traditionally precedented, with the détente seemingly having failed to steer China and Japan away from routine cycles of financial cooperation adopted by political tensions.
Over the subsequent few years, the détente’s failure to determine sustained cooperation will likely be a subject of analysis amongst students of Sino-Japanese relations. This analysis might supply insights into the function of the USA in China and Japan’s relationship, or on the constraints of economics alone as a driver of bettering relations. Most importantly, the examine of the détente might present a studying expertise for the practitioners of Sino-Japanese relations. In doing so it could possibly function the premise of a brand new case for optimism sooner or later.
Adlakha, H. (2020, September 2nd) Chinese Experts Think US-China Rivalry Accelerated Abe Shinzo’s Departure – Just Like in 2007 [Article] Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/2020/09/chinese-experts-think-us-china-rivalry-accelerated-shinzo-abes-departure/ [accessed 12/11/20]
Ashan, R.N. et al. (2020, April 18th) Atlantic Trade and the Decline of Conflict In Europe [Article] Retrieved from https://voxeu.org/article/atlantic-trade-and-decline-conflict-europe?fbclid=IwAR2AXD8ckOXRUxjyh1CwzuEOdMcHPd6FWxiidhUUFstIw2ptU8ypG_5_ly0 [accessed 10/11/20]
BBC News (2020a, June 16th) India-china Dispute: The Border Row defined in 400 Word [Article] Retrieved from: https://www.bbc.co.uk/information/world-asia-53062484 [accessed 28/10/20]
BBC News (2020b, November 16th) RCEP: Asia-Pacific entries type World’s Largest Trading Bloc [Article] Retrieved from https://www.bbc.co.uk/information/world-asia-54949260 [accessed 18/11/20]
Bisley, N. (2020, November 10th) Biden Will Place Asia Back on the Centre of Foreign Policy – however will his Old-School Diplomacy Still Work? [Article] Retrieved from https://theconversation.com/biden-will-place-asia-back-at-the-centre-of-foreign-policy-but-will-his-old-school-diplomacy-still-work-148095 [accessed 12/11/20]
Booth, Ok. and N.J. Wheeler (2007) The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics, Chippenham; Palgrave Macmillan
Brito, E. (2019, July 17) The Sino-Japanese Security Paradox: Why Security Tensions Will Remain Despite Cooperation [Blog post] Retrieved from https://thegeopolitics.com/the-sino-japanese-security-paradox-why-security-tensions-will-remain-despite-cooperation/ [accessed 28/6/20]
Carnegie Endowment (2010) Regional Trade Blocs: The Way To The Future?, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; USA
CGTN (2019, December 25th) China, Kapan Agree to Deepen Cooperation in Various Fields [Article] Retrieved from https://information.cgtn.com/information/2019-12-25/China-Japan-agree-to-deepen-cooperation-in-various-fields-MIltFvXSjm/index.html [accessed 2/11/20]
Chand, B. and Z. Garcia (2017), Power Politics and Securitization: The Emerging Indo-Japanese Nexus in Southeast Asia, Asia & The Pacific Policy Studies, 4 (2), 310-324
Chang, F.Ok. (2018, October 17th) On The Mend?: Sino-Japanese Relations, Foreign Policy Research Institute [Blog post] Retrieved from https://www.fpri.org/article/2018/10/on-the-mend-sino-japanese-relations/ [accessed 18/10/19]
Chiang, M.H. (2019) Contemporary China-Japan Relations: The Politically Driven Economic Linkage, East Asia, 36, 271-290
Dreyer, J.T. (2014) China and Japan: ‘Hot Economics, Cold Politics’, Obris, 58 (3), 326-341
European Commission (2020, February 1st) The European Union, What It Is and What Is Does [Report] Retrieved from The EU – what it’s and what it does (europa.eu) [accessed 22/11/20]
Fitzpatrick, M. (2019, October 3rd) How Japan Could Go Nuclear [Article] Retrieved from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2019-10-03/how-japan-could-go-nuclear [accessed 4/9/20]
Gardner Feldman, L. (2019, May 23rd) From Fear to Friendship: Franco-German Relations in 1949 and 2019 [Article] Retrieved from https://www.aicgs.org/2019/05/from-fear-to-friendship-franco-german-relations-in-1949-and-2019/ [accessed 19/11/20]
He, Y. (2013) Forty Years in Paradox: Post-normalisation Sino-Japanese Relations, China Perspectives, 2013/4, 7-16
Hurst, D. (2018, July 6th) Japan and China’s ‘Tactical Détente’ [OP-ED] Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/2018/07/japan-and-chinas-tactical-detente/ [accessed 1/7/20]
Ikenberry, G.J. et al. (2018) Introduction: Ordering the World? Liberal Internationalism in Theory and Practice, International Affairs, 94 (1), 1-5
Ito, A. (2019, June 29th) China’s Belt and Road Initiative and Japan’s Response: From Non-Participation to Conditional Engagement [Article] Retrieved from https://hyperlink.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12140-019-09311-z [accessed 26/8/20]
Johnson, J. (2019, September 30th) Tenuous Ties: Few Signs of substance Behind Warming Sino-Japanese Relations as Communist China Marks 70th Anniversary [Article] Retrieved from https://www.japantimes.co.jp/information/2019/09/30/nationwide/politics-diplomacy/tenuous-ties-signs-substance-behind-warming-sino-japanese-relations-communist-china-marks-Seventieth-anniversary/#.XcwtL9X7SUk [accessed 5/6/20]
Katagiri, N. (2019, 10th April) Evolution of Sino-Japanese Relations: Implications for Northeast Asia and Beyond [Blog post] Retrieved from https://www.e-ir.information/2019/04/10/evolution-of-sino-japanese-relations-implications-for-northeast-asia-and-beyond/ [accessed 28/10/19]
Klinger, B et al. (2019, December 18th) Trump Shakedowns are Threatening Two Key US Alliances in Asia [Article] Retrieved from https://www.brookings.edu/weblog/order-from-chaos/2019/12/18/trump-shakedowns-are-threatening-two-key-u-s-alliances-in-asia/ [accessed 13/1/20]
Kobara, J. (2020, September 19th) Japan’s Suga Leans on Abe’s Brother and Holdovers to Handle China [Article] Retrieved from https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Japan-s-Suga-leans-on-Abe-s-brother-and-holdovers-to-handle-China [accessed 20/9/20]
Kydd, A.H. (2000) Trust, Reassurance and Cooperation, International Organization, 54 (2), 325-59
Kyodo, A.J. (2019, December 23rd) Abe and Xi Agree to Work to Elevate Japan-China Ties to New Level [Article] Retrieved from https://www.japantimes.co.jp/information/2019/12/23/nationwide/politics-diplomacy/abe-heads-china-trilateral-summit-focus-falls-meeting-moon/ [accessed 14/1/20]
Lee, J. (2011, May 5th) Senkaku/Diaoyu: Islands of battle [Article] Retrieved from: https://www.historytoday.com/archive/senkakudiaoyu-islands-conflict [accessed 16/5/20]
Liesman, S. (2019, November 5th) Trade War Losses for the US and China Grow into the Tens of Billions of Dollars [Article] Retrieved from https://www.cnbc.com/2019/11/05/trade-losses-for-the-us-china-mount-into-tens-of-billions-of-dollars.html#:~:textual content=Trade%20warpercent20lossespercent20forpercent20the,tenspercent20ofpercent20billionspercent20ofpercent20dollars&textual content=U.S.%20importspercent20frompercent20China%20have,overpercent20thepercent20samepercent20timepercent20frame. [accessed 21/11/20]
Manning, R.A. (2015, October 12th) Asian Stability Hangs In The Balance of Japan-China Relations [Article] Retrieved from https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/10/12/asian-stability-hangs-in-the-balance-of-japan-china-relations/ [accessed 28/9/20]
Mastro, O.S. (2019, January/February) The Stealth Superpower: How China Hid Its Global Ambitions [Article] Retrieved from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/china-plan-rule-asia [accessed 12/10/20]
McBride, J. and B. Xu (2018, March 23rd) Abenomics and the Japanese Economy [Article] Retrieved from https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/abenomics-and-japanese-economy [accessed 14/9/19]
McCurry, J. (2014, May 15) Shinzo Abe reveals plans to raise Japan’s ban on combating in conflicts abroad’, The Guardian [News article] Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/might/15/shinzo-abe-plan-lift-japan-ban-fighting-conflicts-overseas [accessed 14/8/20]
Ministry of Commerce People’s Republic of China (2017, November 22nd) Statistics on China-Japan Trade In September 2017 [Profile] Retrieved from http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/statistic/lanmubb/ASEAN/201712/20171202691134.shtml?fbclid=IwAR1VpGt0cIi-mzLKJhUChxxUrB4ewXS7j2LgqRm2c6BoJhEcQuGlwjjVJlM [accessed 20/11/20]
Nakamura, Ok. (2020, June 10th) Is the Japanese Public on Board With the ‘New Era’ of China-Japan Relations? [Article] Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/2020/06/is-the-japanese-public-on-board-with-the-new-era-of-china-japan-relations/ [accessed 24/11/20]
Nikkei, H.A. (2018, September 19th) Can Japan and China Move Beyond a Tactical Détente? [Article] Retrieved from https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2018/09/19/can-japan-and-china-move-beyond-a-tactical-detente/ [accessed 17/11/20]
Ping, W. (2020, September 20th) Will Suga Lead Japan To New Development Phase?: China Daily Contributor [Article] Retrieved from https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/will-suga-lead-japan-to-new-development-phase-china-daily-contributor [accessed 12/11/20]
Rachman, G. (2020, August 31st) Shinzo Abe and His Struggle with Xi Jinping [Article] Retrieved from https://www.ft.com/content material/84748554-62a2-4a83-8fea-fb4607e0faaa [accessed 1/9/20]
Rich, M., M. Inoue and B. Dooley (2020, October 26th) Japan’s Next Prime Minister Emerges From Behind The Curtain [Article] Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/14/world/asia/japan-prime-minister-yoshihide-suga-bio.html?searchResultPosition=2 [accessed 9/11/20]
Rudden, J. (2020, July 31st) Direct Investment Position of the US in China 2000-2019 [Article] Retrieved from https://www.statista.com/statistics/188629/united-states-direct-investments-in-china-since-2000/ [accessed 9/8/20]
Shimada, G. (2018, September 4th) Japan and China Take First Step Toward Joint Infrastructure Abroad [Article] Retrieved https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Japan-and-China-take-first-step-toward-joint-infrastructure-abroad [accessed 6/11/20]
Shimbun, S. (2017, August 18th) Japan’s Transfer of Bullet Train Technology A Mistake. China, of Course, Has Copied It [Article] Retrieved from https://japan-forward.com/japans-transfer-of-bullet-train-technology-a-mistake-china-of-course-has-copied-it/ [accessed 8/10/20]
Sieg, L. (2019, November 19th) Mission Unaccomplished – Abe’s Drive To Revise Pacifist Constitution [Article] Retrieved from https://www.japantimes.co.jp/information/2019/11/19/nationwide/politics-diplomacy/shinzo-abe-revise-constitution/ [accessed 23/12/19]
Tamaki, N. (2020) Japan’s Quest for a Rules-Based International Order: The Japan-US Alliance and the Decline of US Liberal Hegemony, Contemporary Politics, 26 (4), 384-401
The Guardian (2014, January 19th) Sino-Japanese Tensions [Article] Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jan/19/china-japanese-tensions-dangerous-drum-of-nationalism [accessed 12/11/20]
West, J. (2020, January 20th) The China-Japan Economic Relationship Is Getting Stronger [Article] Retrieved from https://www.brinknews.com/the-china-japan-economic-relationship-is-getting-stronger/ [accessed 1/2/20]
Wijaya, T. and Y. Osaki (2019, February 15) Is This a True Thaw in Sino-Japanese Relations?, The Diplomat [Article] Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/2019/02/is-this-a-true-thaw-in-sino-japanese-relations/ [accessed 27/10/19]
World Bank (n.d.) The World Bank In China [Profile] Retrieved from https://www.worldbank.org/en/nation/china/overview [accessed 23/11/20]
Xinhua (2020, February 29th) China, Japan Pledge Cooperation In Fighting COVID-19 Epidemic [Article] Retrieved from http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-02/29/c_138828544.htm [accessed 3/4/20]
Yoshida, S. (2019, October 17th) Nuclear Deterrence: Mixed Messages for Japan [Article] Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/2019/10/nuclear-deterrence-mixed-messages-for-japan/ [accessed 12/11/20]
Zhou, L. (2020, September 25th) China-Japan Relations: New Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga Agrees to Work with Xi Jinping to Boost Stability [Article] Retrieved from https://www.scmp.com/information/china/diplomacy/article/3103110/china-japan-relations-new-prime-minister-yoshihide-suga-agrees [accessed 30/9/20]
Zou, Ok. (2003) Sino-Japanese Joint Fishery Management within the East China Sea, Marine Policy, 27, 125-142